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This paper distinguishes in Maxwell’s thought between “atomic molecules” and
“ultimate atoms,” and arrives at a set of properties that characterize each type of
atom. It concludes that Maxwell is a mathematical atomist, an approach that
entails the notion that although it is impossible to observe the ultimate atoms as
free particles, we can nevertheless study them as mathematical observables, on the
caveat that mathematical formalism remains tied to phenomenalism and to
theoretical interpretations of such phenomena as, for example, mass and force
variations, gravitational pull, gas diffusion and viscosity, and heat conduction.
Each generation, from the earliest dawn of science to the present time,
has contributed a due proportion of its ablest intellects to the quest of
the ultimate atom. (Maxwell 1873, p. 437)
1. Introduction
Nineteenth-century physicists and philosophers inherited from their predeces-
sors a number of atomic explanations, which they developed and/or subjected
to criticism in varied ways. In David M. Knight’s words, “the nineteenth cen-
tury stands out as a century in which scientists were deeply divided over atomic
explanations. There was no one classical, received atomic theory, but rather a
number of theories overlapping in their explanatory ranges” (Knight 1967,
p. 2). To provide a sketchy overview of these theories, mathematical physicists
made use of atoms principally in the sense of inelastic corpuscles or inertial force
points, often characterized, as per Boscovich and Kant, by various attractive-
repulsive forces acting either inherently from within the corpuscles/energy
points or lying in the medium between the particles. The physics of Newton,
the Carnots, Lagrange and Poisson was based on the existence of indivisible
hard bodies acting mechanically in conservative systems, both ponderable
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matter and the imponderable ether being presumed to be composed of such
bodies. The chemists’ idea of atoms was essentially Daltonian inasmuch as they
identified undecomposed chemical elements with specific elementary atoms of
differing and distinct weights (Nye 1976, p. 247). But as Mary Jo Nye has
observed, “this conception had more affinity with the Aristotelian-Averroestic
minima naturalia than with the qualitatively identical Greek-Democritean
atoms, although like Democritus’ atoms, Dalton’s were physically and chem-
ically indivisible” (1976, p. 247). Not only did nineteenth-century physicists
rework received theories of the atom, but they developed new explanatory
scenarios, one of the most famous ones being Kelvin’s vortex atom, for which
Maxwell himself had expressed a degree of admiration. Here I argue that
Maxwell, too, promoted a novel view of the atom, one that was rooted in kinetic
theory: inherent in Maxwell’s writings is the theory of mathematical atomism,
according to which the fundamental building blocks of physical reality, what
he refers to as “ultimate atoms,” cannot exist in nature in an unconfined state. It
would therefore be impossible to observe them empirically as free particles, but
they can be studied mathematically. This is a modest essay in that very prob-
lematic, placing a particular focus onMaxwell’s encyclopedia entry of 1875 and
on other of his works from the 1870s, which are examples of his more mature
thinking on atoms and molecules.
The distinction between “atomic molecules” and “ultimate atoms” has been
anticipated in extant criticism in varied ways, and so this essay brings concep-
tual sharpness to a distinction that is latent within the literature. A focus on this
distinction allows for the study of the relation in Maxwell’s thought between
the two types of atoms, which in turn shows that for him the fundamental
building blocks of all physical reality remain in a confined state never to be
empirically observed, although we can study them via a fruitful combination
of phenomenalism and mathematical formalism. Maxwell’s methodology
entailed the premise that any description of these ever elusive particles must
account for spectroscopic observations (i.e., vibrational/rotational motions)
and theoretical interpretations of such phenomena as, for example, mass and
force variations, gravitational pull, gas diffusion and viscosity, and heat conduc-
tion. The need for any atomic theory to satisfy these demands was Maxwell’s
scientific compass when he came to critically assess some of the period’s most
influential atomic theories. It was also the principle that led him to assert the
existence of atomic molecules on the one hand and ultimate atoms on the other
as the constituent components of the former type of atoms.
The nineteenth century, as Peter Achinstein put it, saw the “atom’s empir-
ical eve,” and Maxwell contributed substantially to the debate of as to whether
bodies consist of continua or indivisible parts (Achinstein 2007; see also Garber
1978). This question stirred spirited debates among the period’s scientists and
philosophers (i.e., Knight 1967; Scott 1970; Levere 1971; Nye 1976; and
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Rocke 1984). As Maxwell notes, “the question of the existence of atoms has
once more become conspicuous among scientific inquiries” (Maxwell 1875a,
p. 36). Maxwell’s preoccupation with the atomic constitution of bodies began
at least as early as in 1849, when he was only eighteen years old and an under-
graduate at EdinburghUniversity (Maxwell 1990, I, 1849–1850, pp. 133–83).
He returned to the problem when he was still revising his paper on Saturn’s
rings in 1857, at which time he was already professor of natural philosophy
at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and elected fellow of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh (Maxwell 1990, I, 1857, pp. 553–56). But his more serious engage-
ment with the question coincides with his work on the kinetic theory of gases,
which led him to a study of the collisions of particles as a means of establishing
the properties of gases (Maxwell 1990, I, 1859, pp. 606–11).1 On May 10,
1859, just a few months before he read his first paper on the subject at the
Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at Aberdeen,
Maxwell wrote a letter to George Stokes with the following question: “do you
think there is any so complete a refutation of this theory of gases as would make
it absurd to investigate it further so as to found arguments upon measurements
of strictly ‘molecular’ quantities before we know whether there be any mole-
cules?” (Maxwell 1990, I, 1859, p. 610). Despite the degree of skepticism that
Maxwell expresses here about the validity of the theory of the molecular struc-
ture of bodies, his exercises suggested to him that only the existence of a “com-
plete refutation” of this theory could thwart his efforts. This somewhat agnostic
attitude gradually gave way to a greater degree of certainty, as this is expressed
his seminal paper of 1867 “On the Dynamical Theory of Gases” (Read on May
31, 1866), where he abandons his former Clausian hypothesis thatmolecules are
hard elastic spheres, now supposing them, in a Boscovichian twist of thought, to
repel each other with forces varying inversely as the fifth power of the distance
(Maxwell 1867, p. 51).2 Here, Maxwell evokes Democritus, Epicurus and
Lucretius, and frames his inquiry as a problem that inheres in the question of
as to whether matter is a continuum or composed of discreet and indivisible
particles. Quite suggestively, the paper opens with the following statement:
“Theories of the constitution of bodies suppose them either to be continuous
and homogeneous, or to be composed of a finite number of distinct particles
or molecules” (Maxwell 1867, p. 49). Theories that uphold the notion of a con-
tinuum lack solid mathematical foundations capable of describing the observed
properties of bodies, and they are therefore to be seen as dogmas rather than
1. On the history of kinetic theory andMaxwell’s role in it, see Brush 1976; Porter 1981,
pp. 77–116; Porter 1986, pp. 111–26; Garber, Brush and Everitt 1986, esp. pp. 4–20; and
Brush and Garber, 1995.
2. For more information on the reception of the Boscovichian atom by Maxwell and
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theories of substantial scientific merit (Maxwell 1867, p. 49). As he states in a
lecture he delivered before the British Association at Bradford in 1873, “We
should thus, in imagination, arrive at the atom, which, as its name literally
signifies, cannot be cut in two. This is the atomic doctrine of Democritus,
Epicurus, and Lucretius, and, I may add, of your lecturer” (Maxwell 1873,
p. 47). Maxwell’s conviction in the atomic constitution of bodies is repeated
in various places throughout his mature works, such as in a chapter in his pop-
ular Theory of Heat (1871) entitled “Molecular Theory of the Constitution of
Bodies” (Maxwell 1871a, pp. 281–312), and in 1875 in a two-part paper in
Nature entitled “On the Dynamical Evidence of the Molecular Constitution
of Bodies.” Here, he assertively notes that “whatever may be our ultimate con-
clusions as to molecules and atoms, we have experimental proof that bodies may
be divided into parts so small that we cannot perceive them” (Maxwell 1875b,
p. 357). Our understanding of the nature of the “molecules and atoms”may still
be inconclusive, but Maxwell is adamant in his conviction that bodies are com-
posed of atoms. It is therefore natural to assume thatMaxwell evolved into a firm
supporter of atomism. But he was not merely motivated to find an answer to the
question of as to whether matter is composed of atoms or not. His interest was
tied with the issue of the ontology and properties of the fundamental particles
of physical reality.
2. Maxwell’s Ultimate Atoms and Atomic Molecules
The distinction between “atoms” and “molecules” was at least as old as
Clausius’ seminal paper of 1857, where, as Elizabeth Garber has observed,
he “distinguished atoms frommolecules, and he demonstrated that molecules
were complex bodies, subject to rotary as well as translational motions”
(Garber 2014, pp. 140–41). And as David M. Knight noted, “Maxwell used
‘molecule’ wherever possible, defining the term as the smallest possible por-
tion of a particular substance, while atoms were particles which could not be
cut in two” (Knight 1967, p. 77). Following Clausius, Maxwell did distin-
guish between atoms and molecules, but this distinction is not as clear-cut as
we might often assume, because in Maxwell’s mind, “molecules,” although
they admittedly have a complex internal structure, they may very well be
physically indivisible, viz., atomic. Thus, Maxwell wrote to the Bishop of
Gloucester and Bristol Charles John Ellicott in November 1876 that “The
comparison of atoms or of molecules to ‘manufactured articles’, was originally
made by Sir J. E D. Herschel” (Maxwell 2002a, vol. III, 1876, Part I, p. 416).
In this example, Maxwell’s “or” is an inclusive locution, like the Latin “vel.,”
to signify that if molecules, although having an internal structure, are indeed
indivisible and indestructible (atomic), then God manufactured them as they
are at some point in time. On such occasions, “molecules” refers to indivisible
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particles, so that “atoms” and “molecules” can be read as cognates. In his
lecture on “Molecules” of 1873, Maxwell explained that
A drop of water, to return to our former example, may be divided into a
certain number, and no more, of portions similar to each other. Each of
these the modern chemist calls a molecule of water. But it is by no
means an atom, for it contains two different substances, oxygen and
hydrogen, and by a certain process themoleculemay be actually divided
into two parts, one consisting of oxygen and the other of hydrogen.
According to the received doctrine, in each molecule of water there are
two molecules of hydrogen and one of oxygen. Whether these are or are
not ultimate atoms I shall not attempt to decide. We now see what a
molecule is; as distinguished from an atom […] An atom, if there is
such a thing, must be a molecule of an elementary substance. Since,
therefore, every molecule is not an atom, but every atom is a molecule, I
shall use the word molecule as the more general term. (Maxwell 1873,
p. 437)
It is quite straightforward to understand why a molecule of water cannot be
termed an atom. Naturally, then, “every molecule is not atom.” However,
Maxwell’s “but every atom is a molecule” may read somewhat problematic:
in what sense is every atom a molecule and how are they to be distinguished
from the particles to which he refers in the same passage as “ultimate atoms”?
As indicated above, there are two types of molecules in Maxwell’s thought,
viz., molecules that are known to be physically divisible into constituent
parts, like a water molecule, and molecules that although may consist of
parts, they are nevertheless physically indivisible. We may refer to the latter
as “atomic molecules.” Indeed, in his 1875 entry for Encyclopædia Britannica,
Maxwell asserted that a molecule can be treated as an atom only insofar as it
operates as a conservative system: “Our definition of a molecule is purely
dynamical. A molecule is that minute portion of a substance which moves
about as a whole, so that its parts, if it has any, do not part company during
the motion of agitation of the gas” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 40). For Maxwell,
molecules can be said to be atomic on the caveat that they travel as indivis-
ible quantities, but the fact that they are physically indivisible should not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that they do not have internal constituent
components, viz., “ultimate atoms.”We may therefore distinguish from the
outset between “atomic molecules,” “molecules” and “ultimate atoms.” The
next sub-sections concentrate on Maxwell’s interpretation of the properties
and nature of these two types of atoms, before turning to his mathematical
atomism and the ways in which it underpins his conviction that although an
answer to the problem of the atoms’ origin is scientifically untenable, we can
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2.1. Ultimate Atoms
Maxwell opens his encyclopedia article with a brief overview of ancient Greek
theories of matter fromAnaxagoras andDemocritus to Epicurus, and he swiftly
leaps from the Greeks to Descartes and Leibniz, before landing at a rather more
extensive account of Boscovich’s atomism. He regards the Boscovichian atom
an example of puremonadism, whereby we have elements that occupy space by
means of force rather thanmaterial extension. Unlike Kant, who theorized that
monads emit two overlaid forces (the attractive and the repulsive), Boscovich
conceptualized his puncta as force-shell atoms projecting one unified force that
repels at some distances and attracts at others (Boscovich [1758] 1966, p. 10).3
Boscovich took into consideration contemporary developments in chemistry
and theorized that the degrees of matter solidity we observe, from rigid bodies
to liquids and gases, are rooted in the ways that atoms cohese. He first devel-
oped his theory of the limits of cohesion and unconhesion in relation to the
repulsive/attractive force radiating out of an atom in his De Lumine (1748),
where he argued that the elementary particles are indivisible and materially
unextended puncta that occupy space bymeans of the repulsive force they exert
around them (Boscovich 1766, p. 68). Boscovich’s atoms do not touch, like the
atomist’s theory or Leibniz’s monads (Boscovich 1766, p. 68). He rejected the
arguments for infinite divisibility, which are based on a mathematical and geo-
metrical analysis of continua, and held that his theory picks no argument with
geometricians and mathematicians while retaining the atom’s indivisibility
(Boscovich 1766, pp. 70–72).
Each of Boscovich’s atoms, Maxwell summarizes, “is an indivisible point,
having position in space, capable of motion in a continuous path, and posses-
sing a certain mass, whereby a certain amount of force is required to produce a
given change of motion. Besides this the atom is endowed with potential force,
that is to say, that any two atoms attract or repel each other with a force
depending on their distance apart” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 37). An ultimate atom,
or what he alternatively referred to as “the pure elementary atom” (Maxwell
2002a, vol. III, 1874, Part II, p. 119), should have these Boscovichian proper-
ties indeed: a stated and conservedmass along with the tendency to preserve its
state of rest or uniform motion, and an attractive/repulsive force. As Maxwell
notes in 1871 in his Theory of Heat, even “If a molecule were a mathematical
point,” it would still be “endowed with inertia and with attractive and repul-
sive forces […] But if it be a body having parts andmagnitude, these parts may
have motions of rotation or of vibration relative to each other, independent of
the motion of the centre of gravity of the molecule” (Maxwell 1871a, p. 290).
3. For a concise account of Boscovich’s theory of the wave-like behaviour of the repulsive-
attractive force that the puncta radiate, a factor that sets the Ragusan philosopher’s theory apart
from Kant’s, see Holden 2004, esp. p. 247.
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That said, pace Boscovich, Maxwell follows Faraday’s suggestion that atoms
may be mutually penetrable and argues that “Boscovich himself, in order to
obviate the possibility of two atoms ever being in the same place, asserts that
the ultimate force is a repulsion which increases without limit as the distance
diminishes without limit, so that two atoms can never coincide” (Maxwell
1875a, p. 37). For Maxwell, “this seems an unwarrantable concession to the
vulgar opinion that two bodies cannot co-exist in the same place. This opinion
is deduced from our experience of the behavior of bodies of sensible size, but we
have no experimental evidence that two atoms may not sometimes coincide”
(Maxwell 1875a, p. 37). Maxwell insists that we should not apply our pre-
sumptions about the nature of matter to atoms. In this way, “Many persons
cannot get rid of the opinion that all matter is extended in length, breadth,
and depth. This is a prejudice […] arising from our experience of bodies con-
sisting of immense multitudes of atoms” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 37). Maxwell
contends that Boscovich’s account still suffers from the perceived notion that
two elements cannot occupy the same unit of space at the same time (see also
Harman 1998, pp. 184–86). This assumption should be seen as a dogma un-
supported by scientific evidence.4Wemay thus deduce that a third property of
Maxwell’s ultimate atoms is that two ormore such particles may interpenetrate
and occupy the same point in space. The property of atomic interpenetrability
is predicated in Maxwell’s mind on the assumption that within the repulsive
force field there exists an attractive region despite the very close proximity of
the particles (Maxwell [1876] 2002a, vol. III, Part I, p. 348).
To sum up, we can identify three properties that characterize Maxwell’s
ultimate atoms. They have a conserved mass along with the tendency to pre-
serve their state of rest or uniformmotion, they exert attractive and repulsive
forces, and they may very well be capable of occupying the same point in
space. As we will see in the third section, we may also add that Maxwell’s
ultimate atoms do not exist in nature as unconfined, free particles and that
they can thus be studied only mathematically. However, in order to appre-
ciate the force and logic of Maxwell’s view, it is instructive to explore first
his interpretation of the properties of atomic molecules.
2.2. Atomic Molecules
Maxwell refrained from drawing any assertive conclusion regarding the ques-
tion of as to whethermolecules are extended or unextended, material bodies or
the centers of force fields. They must nevertheless have a stated mass and exist
in a process of continuous reconfigurations determined by their motions
(Maxwell 1875a, p. 38). According to Maxwell, by calculating a molecule’s
mass in relation to “the amount of motion which exists among the small parts,
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independent of the visible motion of the medium as a whole,” one should be
able to determine the total energy of a material system. Regardless of as to
whether a material system has a particular velocity or not, its internal parts
have kinetic energy, the calculation of which will give us information about
the relative masses of the molecules considered as moving bodies (Maxwell
1875a, p. 38). In order to determine a molecule’s kinetic energy, Maxwell
considers material systems in states of stationary motion and translational
speed. The kinetic energy of the parts of the former system is the outcome
of the attractive and repulsive forces that each particle exerts on the other. This
naturally leads to a state of equilibrium where we have a material system in
stationarymotion, the velocity and direction of its parts remaining unchanged.
In both cases, particles are to be seen as conservative systems in line with the
law of the conservation of energy. This is self-evident because “all bodies with
whichwe are acquainted are conservative systems, whichwould not be the case
unless their parts were also conservative” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 38).
Once Maxwell began to calculate the masses of molecules and to describe
their motions, it became obvious to him that they must have a complex
internal structure, primarily because of their vibrational motions as they
absorb and emit light at various frequencies. The viscosity of gases played
an important role in the historical development of the kinetic theory of gases
(Darrigol and Renn 2013, pp. 765–88). In 1860, Maxwell had proposed that
gases possess a distribution of velocities. His basic hypothesis is that the
numerous collisions between molecules in a gas would produce a statistical
distribution of velocities in which all velocities might occur, with a known
probability. But Maxwell was troubled because his theorem had “the curious
result” that viscosity is independent of pressure, which was “certainly very un-
expected” (Maxwell 1990, vol. I, 1859, p. 610). Maxwell made the first reli-
able measurements of gas viscosities in order to determine the dependence of
gas viscosity on temperature and pressure. The results were reported in 1866,
reconciling his kinetic theory of gases with observed gas viscosities. He found
that the viscosity of air at a given temperature remains constant when the pres-
sure varies between 1/2 and 30 inches (Maxwell 1867, pp. 49–88).
Despite the success of his formulas, Maxwell was never able to reconcile his
kinetic theory of gases with the observed ratio of specific heats for diatomic
gases. One could use theMaxwell-Boltzmann distribution ofmolecular speeds
to determine the average kinetic energy of a particle in a gas, and show that it
agrees with the equipartition theorem, which states that energy is shared
equally amongst all energetically accessible degrees of freedom of a system.
But the problem rested in the fact that the expected ratio of specific heats
in the case of diatomic molecules, such as hydrogen, nitrogen or oxygen,
was higher than the ratio yielded by experiments. In 1857 Clausius had
derived a general formula for the ratio of specific heats, from which it follows
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that this ratio should be equal to 5/3 for a monatomic gas regarded as a system
of elastic spheres. The spectroscope, nevertheless, was revealing that all mol-
ecules, evenmonatomic ones, cannot be hard elastic bodies and that they must
have a complex internal structure. If the parts of a molecule canmove in such a
way as to absorb and emit light at various frequencies, then they should also,
according to kinetic theory, have their proper share of the total energy of the
molecule (Maxwell 1875a, pp. 42–3). This is because it is possible to account
for this observed molecular vibration only by assuming the existence of an in-
ternal motion or interaction: “In fact one of the first conditions which a mol-
ecule must fulfil is, apparently, inconsistent with its being a single hard body.
We know from those spectroscopic researches which have thrown so much
light on different branches of science, that a molecule can be set into a state
of internal vibration” (Maxwell [1870] 1871b, p. 6). If molecules can rotate or
vibrate, the ratio should be smaller than 5/3. As Stephen G. Brush has noted
here, “the general formula for the ratio is γ= 1 +
2
3þ n, where n is the number
of degrees of freedom of the internal motions of the molecule. According to
Newtonian mechanics, a system of molecules will have 3 translational degrees
of freedom, corresponding to the three independent directions in space in
which each particle may move” (Brush 2003, p. 28). The rest degrees of free-
dom represent internal degrees of freedom (n). According to the general for-
mula, a diatomic molecule, regarded as a mechanical system of two spheres
held together by some kind of attractive forces, would be expected to have
at least n = 3 and therefore γ = 4/3. Although later experiments showed that
the ratio of specific heats of monatomic gases were in agreement with the for-
mula for no internal degrees of freedom, diatomic molecules yielded a ratio of
γ = 7/5 and n = 2. Each mode of translation or rotation corresponds to a single
degree of freedom because only kinetic energy is present. But any mode of
vibration corresponds to two degrees of freedom because there are two stores
of energy: potential and kinetic. As a result, the total number of degrees of
freedom is predicted to be 7, the sum of 3 for the translational degrees of free-
dom, 2 for the rotational ones, and 2 for the single vibrationalmode.However,
as has already been stated, the value of γ for air, which consists largely of the
diatomic molecules of oxygen and nitrogen, is 1.408 at usual temperatures,
which is very close to 7/5. This suggests that for diatomic molecules, n is 5
rather than 7. Maxwell could not find any convincing reason why the equipar-
tition theorem should not apply to the internalmotions of gasmolecules.5 The
discrepancy between theoretical and experimental specific heats remained an
unsolved problem until the advent of quantum theory.
5. For an illuminating discussion of the limitations of the kinetic theory for establishing
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The incompleteness of the kinetic theory of gases notwithstanding, contem-
porary advances convinced Maxwell that molecules should not be presumed to
be material bodies, but we may assume them to be conservative systems with
a stated mass and in continuous motion. They radiate a repulsive/attractive
force and they are capable of vibration, emitting and absorbing light at varying
frequencies, which is indicative of the fact that they must have a complex in-
ternal structure. Maxwell, moreover, suggests that we may limit the essential
conditions that an atomic molecule must satisfy to three: “permanence in
magnitude, capability of internal motion or vibration, and a sufficient amount
of possible characteristics to account for the difference between atoms of
different kinds” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 45). The first condition is a restatement
of the principle of an atomic molecule’s energy conservation inasmuch as since
we are seeking a stable and indivisible particle, then it must have a stated and
conserved mass. The second condition reminds us that atomic molecules must
be capable of vibratory or rotational motion, and the third one holds that in
order to be able to account for the diversity of substances we may observe in
the natural world, atomic molecules cannot be homogeneous.Wemay also add
that, as in the case of the ultimate atoms, we should not suppose that atomic
molecules are impenetrable. Like ultimate atoms, then, atomicmolecules could
have the property of inter-penetrability. If this were the case, then there must
exist some attractive forces within the region of the repulsive force capable of
binding the two into a single point in space (Maxwell 2002a, vol. III, 1876,
Part I, p. 348).
3. Maxwell’s Evaluation of Atomic Theories
Maxwell applied his concepts of atoms and molecules to contemporary
atomic theories. Having provided the method for determining a molecule’s
mass andmotion in his encyclopedia article, he revisits what he appears to have
conceived of as the main families of atomism: the Democritean solid atoms,
the Boscovichian force centers and Thomson’s vortex atoms. The Democritean
atom, which according to Maxwell was also adopted by Newton, satisfies the
condition of establishing the permanent properties of bodies, but it fails to
account for the vibrations of molecules that the spectroscope revealed. The
mathematical investigations of Poisson, Navier and the French School were
premised on the assumption that bodies are composed of atoms whose
configurations determine those objects’ properties, but for Maxwell, “as
the same results have been obtained by Stokes and others without any such
hypothesis, this of itself is no evidence of atomic structure” (Maxwell [1874]
2002a, vol. III, 1874, Part I, p. 125). Boscovich’s force centres may be truly
indivisible and have more merit for the mathematician who has no problems
introducing new forces into equations. However, a single structure-less force
atom has no intrinsic vibration. Only an interaction between two or more
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such force centers could yield vibrations (see also Nye 1976, p. 254).
Boscovich’s free puncta, therefore, introduce the possibility of separation
and instability, given that we imagine molecules consisting of many such
centers whose interactions cause the system’s vibrational/rotational motions:
“Such centres of force are no doubt in their own nature indivisible, but then
they are also, singly, incapable of vibration. To obtain vibrations we must
imagine molecules consisting of many such centres, but, in so doing, the
possibility of these centres being separated altogether is again introduced”
(Maxwell 1875a, p. 45). The fact that ultimate atoms have a stated mass and
an attractive/repulsive force may indeed appear to bring Boscovich’s puncta
and Maxwell’s ultimate atoms to a close epistemological proximity. After
all, as Maxwell asserted in 1877 in his review of Henry William Watson’s
Kinetic Theory of Gases, “the best thing we can do is to get rid of the rigid
nucleus altogether, and substitute for it an atom or Boscovich —a mathe-
matical point endowed with mass and with powers of acting at a distance on
other atoms” (Maxwell 2002b, vol. III, 1877, Part II, p. 499). And as he
wrote in 1879 to Otto Schmitz-Dumont, just a few months before passing
away, “If we are to give up a ‘continuum’, let us try what we can do with the
force-points of Boscovich, each of which has a determinate mass” (Maxwell
2002b, vol. III, 1879, Part II, p. 736). But Maxwell’s statements about Bos-
covich’s atom theory are about exploring the contours of such a theory rather
than endorsing it. Maxwell holds that Boscovich erroneously assumed his
force-shell atoms to be impenetrable, but most importantly, puncta exist
in nature as free particles, thereby introducing the possibility of instability.
According toMaxwell, “the vortex ring ofHelmholtz, imagined as the true
form of the atom by Thomson, satisfies more of the conditions than any atom
hitherto imagined” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 45). Thomson’s atom is an elastic and
indivisible energy ring in permanent motion. He was struck by the evident of
permanence, indivisibility and properties of Helmholtz’s “water twists,”
which were vividly and dramatically demonstrated by Tait’s smoke rings.
Tait’s presentations showed that smoke rings behave as independent solids,
which on collision rebound, exhibiting elasticity. Smoke rings also exhibit
vibrational modes in their circular form, and each attempt to cut the smoke
rings with a knife results in the rings simply wriggling around the knife, sug-
gesting a form of indivisibility that does not rely on density, solidity or force,
but on the ring’s intrinsic property of motion. Helmholtz’s vortex theory and
Tait’s illustrations inspired Thomson’s vortex theory of the atom, according to
which atoms are knotted and linked tubular vortices, loci of a special type of
rotary motion within the ether. On this view, matter becomes a mode of mo-
tion. Thomson developed the mathematical basis of his theory, enlisting in its
behalf the support of many distinguished colleagues. What Maxwell found






it.edu/posc/article-pdf/29/2/189/1900757/posc_a_00365.pdf by guest on 09 April 2021
motion, which does not uphold a sharp distinction betweenmatter and energy.
And unlike Boscovich’s puncta, Thomson’s atom is penetrable and it can
vibrate on its own. It is therefore quantitatively and qualitatively permanent,
it vibrates, it is elastic, and it has axiomatic simplicity (Maxwell 1875a, p. 45).
Although the vortex atom satisfied most of Maxwell’s conditions (i.e., per-
manence, penetrability, vibration), it was nevertheless an incomplete theory
with fundamental difficulties.6 ForMaxwell, “the glory of surmounting” these
problems “would be unique.” Firstly, the mathematics that describe the mo-
tions of Thomson’s fluid is lacking (Maxwell 1875a, p. 45). But most impor-
tantly, Thomson’s “primitive fluid has no other properties than inertia,
invariable density, and perfect mobility” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 45). These prop-
erties do not agree with the theoretical interpretations of mass, gravitational
pull between particles and heat conduction (Harman 1998, pp. 197–98). It
would seem absurd, Maxwell continues, to seek an explanation for mass
because it is integral to the very essence of matter, and Thomson does attribute
mass to his vortex rings. However, its application to material bodies is prob-
lematic. OnThomson’s theory, onemust explain the inertia of what ismerely a
mode of motion. According to Maxwell, then, “It is true that a vortex ring at
any given instant has a definite momentum and a definite energy, but to shew
that bodies built up of vortex rings would have suchmomentum and energy as
we know them to have is, in the present state of the theory, a very difficult
task” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 45). Being perfectly elastic, moreover, vortex atoms
fail to account for the attraction between atoms. If atoms rebound against each
other and fly off with the same velocity with which they started before impact,
there will be no decrease in their velocities to account for attraction. If, on the
other hand, particles rebound with slower velocities, attraction between
bodies would be produced. Thomson published a paper addressing this
problem. Here, as Maxwell notes, he “suggests that they are vortex atoms,
which are set into a state of vibration at impact, and go off with a smaller
velocity of translation, but in a state of violent vibration” (Maxwell 1875a,
p. 47).However, this solution introduced a new set of problems: the rotational
or vibrational motion of vortex atoms can now be explained only if they are
conceived of as inelastic “material systems,” not as “mere points” (Maxwell
1875a, p. 47), thereby losing aspects which Maxwell found appealing in
Kelvin’s theory, viz., their ability to vibrate on their own, their axiomatic sim-
plicity and elasticity. This is not to imply that Maxwell discerned any fatal
flaws in Thomson’s theory, but that it was still unfinished, with serious diffi-
culties yet to overcome.
6. For more information on the merits and problems of Thomson’s vortex atomic theory,
see Smith and Wise 1989, pp. 417–44. For a full account of the vortex atom theory and
Maxwell’s view on it, see also Kragh 2003.
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4. Maxwell’s Mathematical Atomism
Given Maxwell’s overall account, the ability of atomic molecules to vibrate
seems to introduce a fundamental contradiction. If an atomic molecule is sup-
posed “to execute vibrations of different periods, as we know that molecules
do,” then they should have a complex internal structure (Maxwell 1875a,
p. 45). A molecule cannot therefore be a material point: “we learn from the
spectroscope that a molecule can execute vibrations of constant period. It
cannot therefore be a mere material point, but a system capable of changing
its form” (Maxwell 1875b, p. 375). And yet, Maxwell is adamant in his
Democritean conviction that “the molecule is incapable of growth or decay,
of generation or destruction […] the molecules out of which these systems are
built—the foundation stones of the material universe—remain unbroken and
unworn” (Maxwell 1873, p. 441). As FreemanDyson has noted in his account
of Maxwell’s presidential Address in Liverpool (1870), “Maxwell explained
how the ancient theory that matter is composed of atoms ran into a logical
paradox. On the one hand, atoms were supposed to be hard, impenetrable
and indestructible. On the other hand, the evidence from spectroscopy and
chemistry showed that atoms have internal structure and are influenced by
outside forces” (Dyson 1999). For Maxwell, nevertheless, atomic molecules
are divisible only conceptually and mathematically. In the second part of
“On the Dynamical Evidence of the Molecular Constitution of Bodies”
(1875), for example, he notes that “we suppose that the constituents of a mol-
ecule are atoms, and that each atom is what is called a material point”
(Maxwell 1875c, p. 375). Such particles are “incapable of rotatory energy or
internal motion” (Maxwell 1875c, p. 375). On Maxwell’s theory, gas mole-
cules, like any other molecule, must be capable of vibration, a property which
can be explained only if these molecules consist of points characterized by
inertia, a radiating force that can repel or attract neighboring atoms and,
possibly, penetrability. But the fact that atomic molecules are to be seen as
“unbroken” and conservative systems means that ultimate atoms cannot exist
in an unconfined state, an atomic molecule remaining only mathematically
divisible into its constituent parts.7
7. It would be interesting to touch lightly here upon the relation between Maxwell’s
ultimate atoms and quarks, if only to indicate that our modern physics of particles have taken
up this idea. As Murray Gell-Mann argued ever since he first proposed their existence, quarks
can be observed only as bound particles andmathematical entities, not as free physical objects.
For Gell-Mann, the physicists’ attempts to observe the quarks were thus bound to fail. In
Gell-Mann’s own words, “up to the present, numerous authors keep stating or implying that
when I wrote that quarks were likely to be ‘mathematical’ and unlikely to be ‘real’, I meant
that they somehow weren’t there. Of course I meant nothing of the kind […] I have always
believed instead in mathematical quarks, ones that do not emerge singly to be observed or
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A number of commentators have drawn attention to the notion that, for
Maxwell, no atomic theory will ever be formidable enough to reveal the
mechanics of existence, humbly conceding the limitations of scientific
knowledge and even of human imagination itself (Tyndall 1871, p. 83;
Pullman 1998, pp. 154–56; Marston 2007, pp. 731–40; Pratt-Smith
2014, pp. 233–57; Marston 2014, pp. 258–91). To use P. M. Harman’s
account as an example, it is often argued that,
Following John Herschel in his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of
Natural Philosophy (1830), Maxwell considered that molecules had “the
essential character of a manufactured article,” and argued that the exact
similarity of each molecule to all others of the same kind “precludes
the idea of its being eternal and self-existent” […] The similarity of
molecules was an argument for their creation, the molecules remaining
to this day as they were created, and “the ineffaceable characters
impressed on them” were “essential constituents of Him who in the
beginning created, not only the heaven and the earth, but the materials
of which heaven and earth consist.” No natural process could affect the
nature of the immutable molecules, and “we are therefore unable to
ascribe either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their
properties to the operation of any causes which we call natural.” The
basis of his argument that molecules were immutable, then, was to be
found in the belief that their similarity was outside the boundaries of
science. (Heimann [sic] 1970, p. 203)
The atom’s properties may remain “ineffaceable” in terms of their ultimate
origin, but we do have the ability to study them. As Maxwell writes in
“Molecules,” just after expressing his agreement with Herschel’s thesis on
the manufactured article,
Thus we have been led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the
point at which Science must stop. Not that Science is debarred from
studying the internal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take
to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which she
cannot put together. But in tracing back the history of matter Science
is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule
has been made, and on the other, that it has not been made by any of
the processes we call natural. (Maxwell 1873, p. 441)
The central thesis of Maxwell’s argument here is that because of “the exact
equality of each molecule to all others of the same kind,” it is impossible to
conceive of how atomic molecules could have come into existence through a
natural process. Spontaneous ex nihilo creation being an unnatural process as
well, atomicmolecules must have beenmanufactured as they are at some point
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in time by an intervening agent.8 Maxwell also insists that it is via “a strictly
scientific path” that we are led “very near to” the conclusion that an under-
standing of the nature of the fundamental building blocks of physical reality
lays beyond the reach of science. The fact that atomicmolecules are indivisible
and that a scientific answer as to their creation is untenable does not necessarily
mean that science is altogether unable to study their “internalmechanism.”To
recall Maxwell’s words, science is not “debarred from studying the internal
mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces.” To begin with,
we have the spectroscope, which can yield some information on the structural
properties of atomic molecules (Maxwell 1873, p. 440). But perhaps more
importantly, we have mathematics. As a point of illustration, we may turn
to Maxwell’s Theory of Heat. In a sub-chapter titled “Kinetic Energy of a Mol-
ecule,”Maxwell notes that the mean kinetic energy of agitation of a molecule
is the product of its mass by half the mean square of its velocity. However, he
continues to observe that “This is the energy due to themotion of themolecule
as a whole, but its partsmay be in a state of relative motion. If we assume, with
Clausius, that the energy due to this internal motion of the parts of the mol-
ecule tends towards a value having a constant ratio to the energy of agitation,
the whole energy will be proportional to the energy of agitation” (Maxwell
1871b, p. 297. See also, Maxwell 1871b, p. 306; Maxwell 1995, vol. II,
1873, pp. 959–60; and Maxwell 1875c, p. 375). Maxwell is combining
phenomenalism and mathematical formalism in order to arrive at a working
hypothetical idea about the behavior of an atomic molecule’s constituent
components which is not unwarranted. Here, we may identify yet another
probably Herschelian influence on Maxwell’s thought. As P. M. Harman
has observed, “Herschel emphasized the role of mathematics as providing
the key to scientific knowledge, and he placed dynamics, the science of force
and motion, ‘at the head of all the sciences’” (Harman 1988, p. 85). Maxwell,
too, Harman notes elsewhere, “stressed the importance of the link between the
mathematical formalism of dynamics and the physical reality depicted […] it
was his aim to translate the mathematical symbols ‘from the language of the
calculus into the language of dynamics’, so that this language should express
‘some property of moving bodies’” (Harman 1995, p. 31).
In 1851, Maxwell wrote a letter to his friend Lewis Campbell asking, “Is
truth nowhere but inMathematics?”Maxwell’s own response was: “I am per-
suaded that the study of x and y is to men an essential preparation for the
intelligent study of the material universe” (Maxwell 1990, vol. I, 1851,
p. 208). A few years later, this belief gave way to certainty. In a letter to
George Wilson, dated 4 January 1855, he confessed with an air of excite-
ment that “It is easy to see that the number of these sensations corresponds
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to what may be called in mathematical language the number of independent
variables, of which sensible colour is a function” (Maxwell 1990, vol. I,
1851, p. 268). There exists an analogy between the laws of numbers and
the laws that govern the behavior and properties of physical objects. Maxwell
made the notions of physical and mathematical analogy the cornerstones to
the methodology he both preached and practiced. This methodology, for
example, underpins his elegant mathematical expression of electromagnetism.
In a manuscript of 1855, “On Faraday’s Lines of Force,” Maxwell termed his
methodology “Physical Analogy.”9 It is a methodology that
combines the advantages, while it gets rid of the disadvantages both of
premature physical theories and technical mathematical formulæ. I
mean the method of Physical Analogy. Of this we have instances in the
substitution of numbers for quantities in all calculations, in the use of
lines in mechanics to represent forces and velocities, in the partial
analogy between the motion of light and that of a particle, and the
more complete analogy between the motion of light and that of a
vibration in an elastic medium. (Maxwell 1990, vol. I, 1855, p. 355)
In another draft of this paper, which he prepared forTransactions of the Cambridge
Philosophical Society (Read on December 10, 1855 and February 11, 1856),
Maxwell repeated the methodology’s benefits and urgency in a more assertive
tone, concluding that “the aim of exact science is to reduce the problems of
nature to the determination of quantities by operations with numbers”
(Maxwell 1864, pp. 27–8). And as he explained in 1860 in a lecture he deliv-
ered at King’s College, London, scientific discovery involves more than mere
mathematical descriptions of fundamental ideas: “in the study of Natural
Philosophy we shall endeavour to put our calculations into such a form that
every step may be capable of some physical interpretation, and thus we shall
exercise powers far more useful than those of mere calculation—the application
of principles, and the interpretation of results” (Maxwell [1860] 1990, p. 672).
When we come to interpret physically the theorems of mathematical systems,
we nevertheless “find that we can not only say ‘This is so’ but ‘This must be so’”
or that “‘This ought to be so, according to the analogy of nature,’” for “otherwise
it would not be consistent with the first principles of truth” (Maxwell 1990,
vol. I, 1860, p. 670). Naturally, our understanding of the properties and nature
of atoms falls within the remit of “‘This must be so’” or “‘This ought to be so,’”
because “In studying the constitution of bodies we are forced from the very
beginning to deal with particles which we cannot observe” (Maxwell 1875b,
p. 357). But this does not pose any fatal problem to scientific progress. On the
9. “Physical analogy” is used here as a covering term; for a distinction between model
and analogy, see Mellor 1968, esp. p. 282.
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contrary, he continues to advise that “if by the careful study of the laws of nature
and their dependence on each other we have been trained into watchfulness
over the processes of our ownminds, and clear habits of thought, we shall come
all the better prepared for the study of higher problems” (Maxwell 1990, vol. I,
1860, p. 668).
Maxwell’s “physical analogy” has been the subject of rigorous critical scru-
tiny since at least 1955, when Joseph Turner’s pioneering essay on the subject
appeared (Turner 1955). A number of historians and philosophers of science
followed suit, uncovering and shedding light on various aspects of Maxwell’s
methodology (i.e., Cat 2001;Kargon 1969;Wise 1982; Simpson 1997; Siegel
1991; Harman 1998, pp. 71–112). Mary Hesse has discerned four different
types of theoretical method in Maxwell’s thought. These are the hypothetical,
the mathematical, the analogical and the deduction from experiments (Hesse
1973, p. 87). The hypothetical method deals with hypotheses that are entirely
mechanical in character, viz., “no physical quantities are involved except those
concerning masses in motion and the forces of weight, impact, pressure, and
friction” (Hesse 1973, p. 88). Nevertheless, when it comes to a subject matter
that is less obviously mechanical, Maxwell was very critical of this type of
method, criticizing its pervasiveness in nineteenth-century physics. In these
cases, physical hypotheses can only provide a partial explanation, making us
liable to turn a blind eye to facts (Hesse 1973, p. 88). Maxwell was also critical
of the purely mathematical method, the analytical subtleties of which often
steer physicists into losing sight of the phenomena to be explained. Physical
analogy, Hesse continues, is positioned midway between “the ‘rash assump-
tions’ of physical hypotheses and the ‘analytical subtleties’ of mathematical
formulae” (Hesse 1973, p. 89). Within the parameters of this methodology,
we may discern, on the one hand, formal analogies of equations that do not
imply identity of physical substance or processes. These formal analogies serve
as thinking aids in our understanding of formal relationships, enabling the
“transfer of mathematical results from one system to another irrespective of
subject matter” (Hesse 1973, p. 90). For example, a fluid flow may be com-
pared to heat flow or electric induction, without nevertheless implying that
these latter processes involve any kind of fluid in motion. On the other hand,
there exist systems of ideas that are really analogous in form, “which must be
distinguished from those that are merely mathematical, and when such anal-
ogies are found, they lead ‘to a knowledge of both [systems], more profound
than could be obtained by studying each system separately’” (Hesse 1973,
p. 90). Here, although the causes of experimentally unobservable processes can-
not be identified with their formal analogues in empirically observed systems,
the relations between causes and effects are so similar that a method of repre-
sentation so general is required as to express the “real similarity of relations
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the cause” (Hesse 1973, p. 90). These general methods are to be deduced from
experiments, adopting an approach similar to the one Newton used to derive
the law of gravitation. This is the deduction from experiments method, and as
Hesse asserts, “it should be clear by now that the methods of analogy and of
deduction from experiments are not separate methods but aspects of a single
method” (Hesse 1973, p. 97). Giora Hon and Bernard Goldstein concur that
Maxwell “insisted on avoiding, on the one hand, any ‘favorite hypothesis’ about
the micro-level from which the macro-phenomena could be deduced and, on
the other, any purely formal expression of remote ‘analytical subtleties’without
consideration of its physical interpretation” (Hon andGoldstein 2012, p. 253).
And likeHesse, they have observed thatMaxwell “sought a ‘middleway’which
he accomplished by means of analogy. Thus he took advantage of both
phenomenalism and mathematical formalism” (Hon and Goldstein 2012,
p. 253). This line of argument stretches at least as far back as Turner’s essay.
However, Hon and Goldstein have continued to stress that Maxwell “appealed
to imaginary physics, that is, the analogue to electromagnetism is a system of
an imaginary incompressible fluid, where ‘imaginary’ is not to be conflated with
‘ideal’. Maxwell constructed an imaginary physical system, contrived solely for
the purpose of developing amathematical scheme applicable to a specific physical
domain. He could then draw consequences from this imaginary system to the
physical domain of electromagnetism that was rich in experimental results”
(Hon and Goldstein 2012, p. 253). Within this framework, “Maxwell’s innova-
tion is to appeal to the power of imagination, and its range was not limited to
known physical systems” (Hon and Goldstein 2012, p. 253). According to Hon
andGoldstein, Maxwell referred to this methodology as “mathematical analogy”
to distinguish it from Thomson’s “physical analogy,” but the term Maxwell
chose, they contend, is unfortunate because it masks its originality and does little
to help to distinguish it from the standard use of analogy (Hon and Goldstein
2012, p. 253). That said, Maxwell’s “mathematical analogy,” as defined by Hon
andGoldstein, is akin toHesse’s account ofMaxwell’s “physical analogy,” but the
former place more emphasis on the imaginary systems that Maxwell contrived,
“where ‘imaginary’ is not to be conflated with ‘ideal’” (Hon andGoldstein 2012,
p. 253).10 Jordi Cat, too, has shown that “contrary to recent emphasis on the
10. At this point, it should be noted that Maxwell’s considerations about mathematics
and physics have a resemblance to the idea of “pre-established harmony” between the two
areas, which later played an important role in theoretical physics, and as Kragh has shown,
it was an issue that preoccupied vortex physicists at the time of Maxwell. Maxwell appears to
be anticipating, among others, David Hilbert and Hermann Minkowski, both of whom,
Kragh has observed, promoted the notion of extending the range of pure mathematics to
physics, maintaining at the same time “that in the end the validity of the axiomatic theory
of the future had to depend on observed facts and that experiment must be the final arbiter of
physical theory” (Kragh 2015, 520).
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nineteenth century rejection of imagination in science in favor of mechanical
objectivity of instruments and rules, Maxwell’s view pointed to an inclusive
methodology that would both accommodate and harness the use of the imagi-
nation” (Cat 2001, p. 398).
Maxwell did not actually use the method of physical analogy to develop a
theory of the behavior and nature of an atomic molecule’s constituent compo-
nents, but he never shied away from underlining its merits. In his comments
on Kelvin’s atomic theory, for instance, he famously wrote: “the method by
which the motion of this fluid [vortex atom] is to be traced is pure mathemat-
ical analysis. The difficulties of this method are enormous, but the glory of
surmounting themwould be unique” (Maxwell 1875a, p. 45). Kelvin’s vortex
atoms can be observed and studied only mathematically, but mathematical
analysis must be tied to phenomenalism and to theoretical interpretations
of such phenomena as mass and force variations, gravitation and heat conduc-
tion. It is this principle that led Maxwell, as we have seen, to criticize Kelvin’s
(and Boscovich’s) atomic theory. He also surmised that the ultimate atoms
ought to be vibrationless particles that could be centers of force or material
objects with a stated mass, the ability to exert attractive and repulsive forces,
and possibly the ability to interpenetrate. To ensure the stability of conserva-
tive systems, moreover, ultimate atoms must remain in a confined state, for
molecules, to recall Maxwell’s words, “remain unbroken and unworn”
(Maxwell 1873, p. 441), even as they must evidently have internal parts.
Composed in 1878 and entitled “A Paradoxical Ode After Shelley,”
Maxwell’s last poem provides significant insight into his view on the ultimate
atoms and the means by which we may study them. The poem opens with the
following lines: “My soul’s an amphicheiral knot / Upon a liquid vortex
wrought / By Intellect in the Unseen residing” (Campbell and Garnett
1882, pp. 649–51). Maxwell’s “liquid vortex” refers to Thomson’s vortex atom
theory, according to which, as we have seen, knotted vortices (atoms) in the
ether comprise all chemical elements. The “amphicheiral knot” in the field
of knot theory is a reference to an oriented knot that is equivalent to its mirror
image.11 Coming from the Greek αμφίχειρας (αμφί [amphi] and χείρ
[cheir-hand]), we may translate “Amphicheiral” as “ambidextrous,” so that
no matter whether the knot is left- or right-handed, it will be deformed to
its mirror image. Maxwell’s amphicheirally knotted soul is configured
according to the choreographies of Thomson’s vortex rings, which reside “in
the Unseen” and can be conjured up only by means of the imagination. The
“Unseen” is the first of several references to The Unseen Universe and its sequel
11. For more information on this point and an informative discussion of the poem more
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Paradoxical Philosophy, an imagined dialogue between Christian scientists and
fictitious German materialist Hermann Stoffkraft, to whomMaxwell’s poem is
addressed (Maxwell 1878, pp. 141–43). A left-handed trefoil knot adorns the
top of The Unseen’s title page. P. M. Harman reminds us that Stewart and Tait
clearly intended their book as a refutation of JohnTyndall’s “Belfast Address” of
1874 (Heimann [sic] 1972, pp. 73–79), where the prominent Irish physicist
and popularizer of science had famously expounded a materialistic conception
of nature: “All religious theories, schemes and systems, which embrace notions
of cosmogony, or which otherwise reach into the domain of science must, in so
far as they do this, submit to the control of science, and relinquish all thought of
controlling it” (Tyndall 1874, p. 61). In response, Tait and Steward employed
the theories of Victorian physics (the ether, energy conservation, the second law
of thermodynamics, and the vortex atom) to confute such “materialistic state-
ments now-a-days so freely made” by demonstrating that “immortality is
strictly in accordance with the principle of Continuity (rightly viewed),” that
is, the principle of the uniformity of nature (Stewart and Tait 1875, p. xii). The
Unseen Universe can thus be regarded, Harman observes, as a popularization of
science for an ideological purpose, although it was intended as a contribution to
the philosophy of nature (Heimann [sic] 1972, p. 73). Stoffkraft succumbs to
the arguments of a blunt polemic and is eventually convinced to trade his er-
roneous convictions for belief in the doctrines of Unseen Universe. Maxwell is
nevertheless keenly aware of the messiness and incomplete nature of the vortex
atom theory in particular and of theoretical physics more generally. Thus, the
poem’s first stanza continues, “While thou dost like a convict sit / With mar-
linspike untwisting it / Only to find my knottiness abiding.” In his conviction
that theUnseen has solved the problem of the ontology of the particles in which
Maxwell’s soul subsists, Stoffkraft remains a “convict” of his own designs who
will never find his way out of the labyrinthine “knottiness” he professes to have
unraveled. Entrusting the doctrines of theUnseen, Stoffkraft remains lost in the
tangled webs of Maxwell’s “knottiness,” a pun on “naughtiness” characteristic
of Maxwell’s generally seriocomic response to his friend and co-author of The
Unseen Tait.
We may never be able to provide a scientific answer to the question of
the origin of both ultimate atoms and atomic molecules, but as long as the
notion of an intervening agent does not thwart our quest for answers, the
chain of knowledge is likely to extend indefinitely:
O never may direct Creation
Break in upon my contemplation,
Still may the causal chain, ascending,
Appear unbroken and unending,
And, where that chain is lost to sight
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Let viewless fancies guide my darkling flight
Through Æon-haunted worlds, in order infinite.
The existence of a creator does not signify, for Maxwell, the point where
science ends. Rather, it is the point where science starts, where a causal chain
begins that has no discernible end to it. The means by which Maxwell
intends to navigate his way through the universe’s “Æon-haunted worlds” is
“viewless fancies,” the powers of the imagination that open a window into
the unseen. It is noteworthy that in an alternative draft of the poem, we read
“atom-haunted worlds” in lieu of “Æon-haunted worlds” (Pratt-Smith
2014, p. 256), indicating that what Maxwell had in mind, in part at least,
was the nature of the atom. But the central question that grows naturally out
of these lines concerns the nature of Maxwell’s imaginative flights. Stella
Pratt-Smith, for one, concludes that Maxwell resorts in these final lines to
the “calm surety of a prayer” that humbly admits the limitations of both
empiricism and the imagination (Pratt-Smith 2014, p. 256). But Maxwell
appears to be celebrating here the powers of the imagination and science,
which may drive us some way closer to an appreciation of the perfection
of the Creation. The fact that there is no end to the knowledge we can acquire
about the physical world, along with the fact that empirical investigation
does have limitations as “that chain is lost to sight,” do not signify the limits
of the imagination and science, but their boundless potential, which is a re-
flection of the unfathomable complexity of God’s designs.12 Maxwell was
very critical of the extravagant speculations that Tyndall’s “Scientific Use
of the Imagination” entails (i.e., Brown 2013, pp. 142–63). In Maxwell’s
seriocomic phrase, Tyndall’s pronouncements may “Tyndalize the imagination”
(Maxwell 1995, vol. II, 1871, p. 617), but they offer little more, in Daniel
Brown’s words, than a “solipsistic failure, whereby the authority attributed to
the faculty serves to reify its fancies […] rather than ‘land[ing] us on the solid
shores of fact’” (Brown 2013, p. 156). Given Maxwell’s aphorisms “of the siren
song of the scientific imagination,” even as late as in circa January 1879 (Maxwell
2002b, vol. III, 1879, pp. 745–46), it is unlikely that he would pray for his
post-mortem imagination’s unbridled freedom, which would render him a
perennial captive, like Stoffkraft, of its siren songs. This, for him, would be a
“curse” (Maxwell 2002b, vol. III, 1879, pp. 745–46). Rather, his reliance on the
imagination in these final lines of the poem is informed by what Hon and
Goldstein identified in Maxwell’s thought as “mathematical analogy,” which
allows for the contrivance of an imaginary physical system expressed in the
12. This exposition of Maxwell’s faith and his view on the science/religion issue lends
support to Paul Theerman’s thesis that “Maxwell denied that scientific truth was dependent
on religious truth, or the reverse. Nonetheless, scientific conclusions could enrich religious
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language of mathematics that is then applied to a specific physical domain, so
that mathematical formalism and phenomenalism remain closely tied.
5. Conclusion
Throughout his career, Maxwell became ever more convinced of the atomic
nature of matter, especially through his study of gases, without, however,
reaching a final verdict on the nature of the ultimate building blocks of
all physical reality. Meanwhile he toyed with several models in his attempts
to account for the properties of gases (e.g., mutually repelling point atoms)
and also discussed several others (e.g., Kelvin’s vortex atom). Maxwell’s
studies suggested to him that physical bodies are made of different kinds
of atomic molecules that exist in the form material bodies or energy points,
exerting a field of attractive and repulsive forces. They have a particular mass
and undergo continuous configurations defined by their motions. They are
capable of vibration, emitting and absorbing light at varying frequencies,
and they could very well be capable of occupying the same point in space.
Due to their vibrational/rotational motions, atomic molecules must consist
of ultimate atoms, vibrationless particles that could be centers of force or
material objects with a stated mass, the ability to exert attractive and repul-
sive forces, and possibly the ability to interpenetrate. The indivisibility and
indestructibility of atomic molecules as conservative systems means that ul-
timate atoms exist only in a confined state, never to be empirically observed
as free particles. They can nevertheless be studied mathematically, and while
we are not able to provide a scientific answer regarding the ultimate origin of
their properties, we can, by means of physical analogy, study their relations
and describe the laws that govern them.
References
Achinstein, Peter. 2007. “Atom’s Empirical Eve: Methodological Disputes
and How to Evaluate Them.” Perspectives on Science 15: 359–390. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1162/posc.2007.15.3.359
Boscovich, Roger Joseph. 1766.Dissertatio De Lumine: Pars Secunda. Vindobonæ:
Typis Joannis Tomæ.
Boscovich, Roger Joseph. (1758) 1966. A Theory of Natural Philosophy.
Cambridge; MA: MIT Press.
Brown, Daniel. 2013. The Poetry of Victorian Scientists: Style, Science and Nonsense.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017
/CBO9781139151078
Brush, Stephen G. 2003. “Introduction.” Pp. 1–33 in The Kinetic Theory of Gases:
An Anthology of Classic Papers with Historical Commentary. London: Imperial
College Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1142/9781848161337_0001





it.edu/posc/article-pdf/29/2/189/1900757/posc_a_00365.pdf by guest on 09 April 2021
Brush, Stephen. 1976.The Kind of MotionWe Call Heat: AHistory of the Kinetic
Theory of Gases in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1: Physics and the Atomists.
Amsterdam: North Holland.
Brush, Stephen, and Elizabeth Garber, eds. 1995. Maxwell on Heat and
Statistical Mechanics. Bethlehem: LeHigh University Press.
Campbell, Lewis, and William Garnett. 1882. The Life of James Clerk
Maxwell. London: Macmillan.
Cat, Jordi. 2001. “OnUnderstanding: Maxwell on the Methods of Illustration
and Scientific Metaphor.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics 32: 395–441. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1355-2198(01)
00018-1
Darrigol, Olivier, and Jürgen Renn. 2013. “The Emergence of Statistical
Mechanics.”Pp. 765–788 inThe OxfordHandbook of theHistory of Physics. Edited
by Jed Z. Buchwald and Robert Fox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dyson, Freeman. 1999. “Why isMaxwell’s Theory SoHard to Understand?”
In James Clerk Maxwell Commemorative Booklet, Fourth International
Congress of Industrial and Applied Mathematics. Edinburgh.
Garber, Elizabeth. 1978. “Molecular Science in Late-Nineteenth-Century
Britain.” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 9: 265–297. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2307/27757380
Garber, Elizabeth. 2014. “Maxwell’s Kinetic Theory 1859–70.” Pp. 139–153
in James Clerk Maxwell: Perspectives on His Life. Edited by Raymond Flood,
MarkMcCartney, andAndrewWhitaker. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
Garber, Elizabeth, Stephen Brush and C. W. F. Everitt, eds. 1986.Maxwell
on Molecules and Gases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gell-Mann, Murray. 1997. “Quarks, Color, and QCD.” Pp. 625–633 in
The Rise of the Standard Model: Particle Physics in the 1960s and 1970s.
Edited by Lillian Hoddeson, Laurie Brown, Michael Riordan, and
Max Dresden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://
doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511471094.037
Harman, P. M. 1970. “Molecular Forces, Statistical Representation and
Maxwell’s Demon.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
1: 189–211. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(70)90009-9
Harman, P. M. 1972. “‘The Unseen Universe’: Physics and the Philosophy
of Nature in Victorian Britain.” The British Journal for the History of
Science 6: 73–79. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007087400011985
Harman, P. M. 1988. “Newton to Maxwell: The ‘Principia’ and British
Physics.” Notes & Records of the Royal Society of London 42: 75–96.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1098/rsnr.1988.0008
Harman, P. M. 1995. “Introduction.” Pp. 1–38 in The Scientific Letters and







it.edu/posc/article-pdf/29/2/189/1900757/posc_a_00365.pdf by guest on 09 April 2021
Harman, P. M. 1998. The Natural Philosophy of James Clerk Maxwell.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heilbron, J. L. 2015. “Boscovich in Britain.” Pp. 99–116 in Relocating the
History of Science: Essays in Honor of Kostas Gavroglu. Edited by Theodore
Arabatzis, Jürgen Renn, and Ana Simões. New York: Springer.
Hesse, Mary. 1973. “Logic of Discovery in Maxwell’s Electromagnetic
Theory.” Pp. 86–114 in Foundations of Scientific Method: The Nineteenth
Century. Edited by RonaldN.Giere and Richard S.Westfall. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Holden, Thomas. 2004.The Architecture ofMatter: Galileo to Kant. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199263264.001.0001
Hon, Giora and Bernard R. Goldstein. 2012. “Maxwell’s Contrived Analogy:
An Early Version of the Methodology of Modeling.” Studies in History and
Philosophy of Modern Physics 43: 236–257. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016
/j.shpsb.2012.07.001
Kargon, Robert. 1969. “Model and Analogy in Victorian Science: Maxwell’s
Critique of the French Physicists.” Journal for the History of Ideas 30:
423–436. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2708567
Knight, David M. 1967. Atoms and Elements: A Study of Theories of Matter in
England in the Nineteenth Century. London: Hutchinson.
Kragh, Helge. 2003. “The vortex atom: AVictorian theory of everything.”
Centaurus 44: 32–114. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1034/j.1600-0498
.2002.440102.x
Kragh,Helge. 2015. “Mathematics and Physics: The Idea of a Pre-Established
Harmony.” Science & Education 24: 515–527. DOI: https://doi.org/10
.1007/s11191-014-9724-8
Levere, Trevor. 1971. Affinity and Matter. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Marston, Philip L. 2007. “Maxwell and Creation: Acceptance, criticism, and
his anonymous publication.” American Journal of Physics 75: 731–740.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1119/1.2735631
Marston, Philip L. 2014. “Maxwell, Faith and Physics.” Pp. 258–291 in James
Clerk Maxwell: Perspectives on His Life and Work. Edited by Raymond Flood,
Mark McCartney, and Andrew Whitaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1864. “III. On Faraday’s Lines of Force.” Transactions
of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 10: 27–83.
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1867. “On theDynamical Theory ofGases.”Philosophical
Transactions 157: 49–88. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstl.1867.0004
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1871a. Theory of Heat. London: Longmans.
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1871b. “Mathematics and Physics: Address by J.
Clerk Maxwell.” Pp. 1–9 in Report of the Fortieth Meeting of The British
Association for the Advancement of Science Held at Liverpool in September
1870. London: John Murray.





it.edu/posc/article-pdf/29/2/189/1900757/posc_a_00365.pdf by guest on 09 April 2021
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1873. “Molecules.” Nature 8: 437–441. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1038/008437a0
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1875a. “Atom.” Pp. 36–49 in Encyclopædia Britannica,
Ninth Edition, vol. 3. Edinburgh: Adams and Charles Black.
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1875b. “On the Dynamical Evidence of the Molecular
Constitution of Bodies.” Nature 11: 357–359. DOI: https://doi.org/10
.1038/011357a0
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1875c. “On the Dynamical Evidence of the Molecular
Constitution of Bodies, II.” Nature 11: 374–377. DOI: https://doi.org/10
.1038/011374a0
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1878. “Paradoxical Philosophy.”Nature 19: 141–143.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/019141a0
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1990. The Scientific Letters and Papers of James Clerk
Maxwell, Volume I: 1846–1862. Edited by P. M. Harman. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Maxwell, James Clerk. 1995. The Scientific Letters and Papers of James Clerk
Maxwell, Volume II: 1862–1873. Edited by P. M. Harman. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Maxwell, James Clerk. 2002a. The Scientific Letters and Papers of James Clerk
Maxwell: Volume III: 1874–1879: Part I: 1874–1876. Edited by P. M.
Harman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maxwell, James Clerk. 2002b. The Scientific Letters and Papers of James Clerk
Maxwell, Volume III: 1874–1879, Part II: 1877–1879. Edited by P. M.
Harman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mellor, D. H. 1968. “Models and Analogies in Science.” Isis 59: 282–290.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/350397
Nye, Mary Jo. 1976. “The Nineteenth-Century Atomic Debates and the
Dilemma of an ‘Indifferent Hypothesis.’” Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part A 7: 245–268. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681
(76)90007-8
Porter, Theodore M. 1981. “A Statistical Survey of Gases: Maxwell’s Social
Physics.” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 12: 77–116. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2307/27757490
Porter, Theodore M. 1986. The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820–1900.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515
/9780691210520
Pratt-Smith, Stella. 2014. “Boundaries of Perception: James Clerk Maxwell’s
Poetry of Self, Senses and Science.” Pp. 233–257 in James Clerk Maxwell:
Perspectives onHis Life andWork. Edited byRaymond Flood,MarkMcCartney,
and Andrew Whitaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pullman, Bernard. 1998. The Atom in the History of Human Thought. Translated






it.edu/posc/article-pdf/29/2/189/1900757/posc_a_00365.pdf by guest on 09 April 2021
Rocke, Alan J. 1984. Chemical Atomism in the Nineteenth Century: From Dalton to
Cannizzaro. Ohio: Ohio State University Press.
Schaffer, Simon. 1997. “Metrology, Metrication, and Victorian Values.”
Pp. 438–474 in Victorian Science in Context. Edited by Bernard Lightman.
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Scott, Wilson L. 1970. Conflict between Atomism and Conservation Theory:
1644–1860. New York: Elsevier.
Siegel, Daniel. 1991. Innovation inMaxwell’s Electromagnetic Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Silver, Daniel S. 2008. “The Last Poem of James Clerk Maxwell.” Notices of
the AMS 55: 1266–1270.
Simpson, Thomas K. 1997. Maxwell on the Electromagnetic Field: A Guided
Study. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Smith, Crosbie and M. Norton Wise. 1989. Energy and Empire: A Biographical
study of Lord Kelvin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stewart, Balfour and Peter Guthrie Tait. 1875. The Unseen Universe: Or,
Physical Speculations on a Future State. London: Macmillan.
Theerman, Paul. 1986. “James Clerk Maxwell and Religion.” American
Journal of Physics 54: 312–317. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1119/1.14636
Turner, Joseph. 1955. “Maxwell on the Method of Physical Analogy.” The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6: 226–238. DOI: https://doi
.org/10.1093/bjps/VI.23.226
Tyndall, John. 1871. Fragments of Science for Unscientific People: A Series of
Detached Essays, Lectures, and Reviews. NewYork: D. Appleton and Company.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.25271
Tyndall, John. 1874. Address Delivered Before the British Association Assembled
at Belfast: with Additions. London: Longmans.
Wise, Norton M. 1982. “The Maxwell Literature and British Dynamical
Theory.” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 13: 175–205. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2307/27757511





it.edu/posc/article-pdf/29/2/189/1900757/posc_a_00365.pdf by guest on 09 April 2021
